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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to determine whether individuals exhibit a behavioral
bias towards pessimism in their beliefs, in a lottery or more generally in an in-
vestment opportunities framework. For this purpose, we design a ￿eld survey on
a sample of 1,540 individuals aiming at deriving a measure of pessimism from an-
swers to hypothetical scenarios. In the context of our experiment, we observe that
individuals are on average pessimistic. We analyze how pessimism is distributed
among individuals, in particular in link with gender, age and income. We also an-
alyze how our notion of pessimism is related to more general notions of pessimism
already introduced in psychology. We ￿nally estimate the possible impact of this
pessimistic bias on the ￿nancial markets equilibrium risk premium.
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Commonly de￿ned, optimism re￿ ects an expectation that good things will happen,
whereas pessimism re￿ ects an expectation that bad things will happen.
Abel (2002) and Jouini-Napp (2006) show that the presence of a pessimistic bias in
individual beliefs leads to a higher risk premium and a lower risk-free rate in ￿nancial
markets equilibrium models. This e⁄ect is particularly interesting in light of the risk-
premium and the risk-free rate puzzles. It remains to analyze to which extent individual
beliefs exhibit such a pessimistic bias.
Previous work on the notion of pessimism/optimism that seems related to this issue
includes empirical studies of economic forecasts as well as psychological surveys.
In the empirical studies of economic forecasts, the participants are analysts, econo-
mists from industry, government, banking, etc. and they provide forecasts on earnings,
dividends or on GDP, consumption, etc. These studies have led to di⁄erent results de-
pending on the contexts even though the main conclusion is towards optimism. Fried
and Givoly (1982), O￿ Brien (1988), Francis and Philbrick (1993), Kang et al. (1994)
and Dreman and Berry (1995) provide evidence that analysts￿forecasts on earnings
are overly optimistic and the converse result is obtained about professional forecasts on
GDP in Giordani and S￿derlind (2005). However, as underlined by Schipper (1991),
Mc Nichols and O￿ Brien (1997), Abarbanell and Lehavy (2001), Darrough and Russell
(2002), professionals￿forecasts may be biased by environmental factors.
In psychology, the notion of pessimism that has been considered so far is very gen-
eral and based on the concept of pessimism as a negative conception of life. In order to
measure personal pessimism, the questions asked in psychological surveys aim at eval-
uating the way the individuals perceive their future. Such a perception of one￿ s future
2takes into account how individuals might in￿ uence future events and involves feelings
like self esteem or overcon￿dence. Standard psychology studies (e.g., Kahneman and
Lovallo, 1993, Taylor and Brown, 1988) conclude to a signi￿cative level of optimism.
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) interpreted that overly optimistic forecasts result from
the adoption of an inside view of the problem, which anchors predictions on plans of
success rather than on past results, the so-called insider bias. With an insider view of
the problem, risk is perceived as a challenge to be overcome by the exercice of skill.
One of the aims of the present paper is to analyze if the optimistic bias pertains
if we get rid of the positive self evaluation and illusion of control biases as well as the
environemental biases and consider investment-like situations on which the individual
has no in￿ uence. More precisely we will focus on "judged" probabilities on events that
have a direct impact on individual well being but that are exogenously given like in
lotteries.
For this purpose, we shall design a survey, involving verbal expressions of beliefs
concerning lotteries, that permits to provide an individual measure of pessimism in such
a context. More precisely, we will measure in a very simple framework the "judged"
probability that individuals assign to the outcomes of a lottery and we will look for
systematic deviations from the objective probability in relation with the nature of the
outcome. Pessimistic individuals are then those for which bad outcomes have a higher
"judged" probability than the objective probability. We shall refer to this notion of
pessimism as ￿pure-hazard introspective pessimism￿(PHIP). ￿Introspective pessimism￿
refers to the fact that our approach is introspective and di⁄erent from a choice-theoretic
approach in the sense that we elicit individual beliefs through verbal expression and
not through pairwise choices. Implicit in such an approach is the assumption that
these beliefs result from a cognitive process. ￿Pure-hazard pessimism￿refers to the fact
3that we are interested in individual beliefs in the face of ￿pure hazard￿ , represented by
lotteries, and not in the face of events whose outcomes the individuals can in￿ uence. We
shall analyze how pure-hazard introspective pessimism is distributed among individuals,
in particular in link with age, gender, income. We shall also analyze how PHIP is related
to other concepts of pessimism already introduced in psychology.
There is a well-known debate between the intuitive approach, for which beliefs exist
prior to the choice behavior and the choice theoretic approach for which beliefs exist
only in so far as they are expressed in choice behavior. Without getting too much
into the details of this debate, we choose an introspective approach which is based on
the verbal expression of the beliefs1 (Fox and Tversky, 1998, Karni, 1996) because it
appears as more adapted to our study. Indeed, the choice-theoretic approach which is
based on pairwise choices requires the embedding of beliefs in a broader model of human
behavior, and we want to avoid the risk of confounding beliefs with other aspects of the
decision making process. Moreover, note that in the choice-theoretic approach, the
utility function as well as the beliefs, or more precisely the subjective probabilities, are
theoretical constructs inferred from the decision maker￿ s choice behavior. They do not
necessarily exist in the mind of the decision maker, whose intuition is assumed to apply
only to choices among alternative courses of action, and therefore do not correspond to
a concept of individual ￿beliefs￿and pessimism, which is the purpose of our study. We
think that the verbal expression of beliefs is valuable, if applied to simple circumstances
in which it is reasonable to expect truthful answers, which is the case for the questions
1This does not mean that the verbally expressed individual beliefs are independent of any decision
choice. As noted by Karni (1996), the two notions of individual beliefs, in the choice-theoretic approach
and in the intuitive approach, are equivalent as soon as we consider that the utility function is state
independent.
4of our survey. Notice that a great number of empirical studies, aiming at eliciting some
dose of pessimism/optimism in the forecasts of individuals in investment-like situations,
also rely on the verbal expression of expectations.
Our data, based on a sample of 1,540 individuals, exhibit a signi￿cative level of PHIP.
More precisely, the measure consists of asking people to imagine a situation where a
fair coin will be tossed ten times. If a person can be thought to win or lose on each
toss of the coin, the question is how many times (out of ten) does the person expect
to win. The mean score we obtain is around 4. This means that in our simple lottery
individuals have a higher (resp. lower) judged probability for bad (resp. good) events.
It is interesting to notice that if there is no gain associated to the coin tossing, then the
average answer is 5, as expected which would mean that the exhibited pessimistic bias
can not be explained by a wrong elementary probability inference.
Our results are very di⁄erent from the results obtained in psychology, with the usual
notions of personal and general pessimism. However, we show that the pure-hazard
introspective pessimism is positively correlated with the usual notions of pessimism in
psychology, and more particularly with the notion of personal pessimism.
As far as the link between pure-hazard introspective pessimism and other demo-
graphic variables is concerned, we observe that in our survey women are more pessimistic
than men. Besides, there is a strong link between PHIP and individual characteristics
such as income, and age.
The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 by presenting the survey
instrument. Section 3 is devoted to the notion of ￿pure-hazard introspective pessimism￿
and we relate it to the di⁄erent notions of pessimism and the di⁄erent approaches previ-
ously adopted in the literature. Section 4 deals with the results, possible interpretations
and an estimation of the possible impact of this pessimistic bias on the equilibrium risk
5premium.
2. Survey instrument (data collection)
The survey was conducted face-to-face in the ￿eld by professional interviewers experi-
enced for in-person surveys. These include both undergraduate and graduate students,
as well as non-students under the management of senior ￿eld work supervisors and se-
nior sta⁄members. Interviewers are trained in general and project-speci￿c interviewing
techniques, such as maintaining objectivity, reading questions as written, and securing
respondent cooperation. Interviewers were continuously monitored during data collec-
tion for quality assurance.
The sample consists of adults, between 22 and 55 randomly chosen and yielded 1,540
responses2. We chose a large enough sample size in order to run cross sectional analysis.
The questionnaire consists of essentially ￿ve parts3.
In the ￿rst part, the participant is supposed to be o⁄ered the opportunity of entering
a heads or tails game in one draw where he/she wins 10 Euros if heads occur. After the
￿rst two questions that deal with the willingness to participate in a game of chance and
why (religious grounds, etc.), in the third question, the individuals are asked to reveal
the maximum amount that they are willing to pay in order to participate. The aim of
this question is to elicit the level of individual absolute risk aversion. The data issued
from this question shall not be analyzed in the present paper.
In the second part, the participant is supposed to be o⁄ered the opportunity of
entering a heads or tails game in ten draws. More precisely, the coin is being tossed
2We obtained similar results on smaller samples (236 individuals) of undergraduate and graduate
students in management and mathematics.
3The whole questionnaire is available upon request.
6ten times; each time heads occurs, the participant is supposed to get 10 Euros. The
participant is then asked for his/her own estimation, according to his/her experience
and his/her luck, of the number of times heads will occur, i.e. how many times (out of
ten) he/she thinks he/she is going to win (and get the ten Euros).
The third part deals with questions as in Barsky et al. (1997) permitting to elicit the
level of individual relative risk aversion. The data shall not be analyzed in the present
paper.
The fourth part deals with optimism/pessimism questions as in Wenglert and Rosen
(2000). The aim of this part is to analyze the correlation between our PHIP with a
standard measure of pessimism in psychology. It includes 16 items concerning personal
events (I will have a happy life, I will keep my best friends,...) and 15 items concerning
general events (there will be a third world war, the unemployment rate shall fall, life
expectancy shall increase, etc.). For each item, individuals are asked about the impor-
tance granted to the considered event (between -10 and +10), as well as its "judged"
probability of occurrence (between 0 and 100). For negatively formulated questions,
the participants had sometimes trouble interpreting the question about the importance
granted to the event, due to the negative scaling. The interviewer then split the question
into two successive ones: 1) is this event positive or negative for you (do you wish that
it happens) ? and 2) how important is it for you (give an answer between 0 and 10) ?
The ￿fth part deals with personal questions, such as gender, age, marital status,
employment status, education and income.
73. Pessimism
Before analyzing the answers to this survey, we will present the di⁄erent concepts of
pessimism considered in the literature and we will discuss our methodology in light of
these di⁄erent approaches.
In theoretical models, the notion of pessimism is related to the way a subjective
distribution departs from subjective one. However, there are many ways to transform
a given objective distribution into a subjective one and to de￿ne related concepts of
pessimism. Common to all these notions4 is the fact that an individual is said to be
pessimistic if his subjective distribution is ￿less favourable￿than the objective one, in
the sense that it puts more (resp. less) weight on the bad (resp. good) states of the
world. A typical example of a pessimistic individual is the one for which the subjective
distribution of a given payo⁄ is given by N
￿
m;￿2￿
; whereas the objective distribution
is given by N
￿
M;￿2￿
with m < M: More generally, all notions of pessimism have in
common that a pessimistic transformation lowers the mean of the distribution under
consideration.
From the empirical and experimental point of view, the concept of pessimism has
been analyzed in relation with four di⁄erent disciplinary ￿elds : ￿nancial economics,
accounting, psychology and decision theory.
In ￿nancial economics empirical studies, an individual is said to be pessimistic if
4For instance, in the Subjective Expected Utility setting, Abel (2002) proposes to relate pessimism to
First order Stochastic Dominance (FSD) and Jouini-Napp (2005b) propose to relate it to the Monotone
Likelihood Ratio (MLR) dominance of Landsberger and Meilijson (1990), or to the central riskiness
property of Gollier (1995, 1997). In Rank-Dependent Utility models, di⁄erent notions of pessimism
have been introduced, which correspond to a FSD shift (Chateauneuf et al., 2005), or to a MLR shift
(Wakker, 2001).
8his/her forecasts of given economic variables (like earnings, dividends, GDP, consump-
tion, etc.) lie signi￿cantly below the true value. These studies focus on forecasts of
￿professionals￿(the participants are analysts, economists from industry, government,
banking, etc.) and have led to di⁄erent results depending on the contexts. Fried and
Givoly (1982), O￿ Brien (1988), Francis and Philbrick (1993), Kang et al. (1994) and
Dreman and Berry (1995) provide evidence that analysts￿ forecasts on earnings are
overly optimistic and the converse result is obtained about professional forecasts on
GDP in Giordani and S￿derlind (2005). However, as underlined by Schipper (1991),
Mc Nichols and O￿ Brien (1997), Abarbanell and Lehavy (2001), Darrough and Russell
(2002), professionals￿forecasts may be biased by environmental factors5.
Since our aim is to evaluate optimism/pessimism caused by human biases that might
be typical of all economic agents, we have chosen to adopt a survey based on hypothetical
scenarios in order to avoid environmental e⁄ects like the insider bias e⁄ect of analysts.
Indeed, with hypothetical questions, environmental factors and incentives (e.g. unique
to analysts) are absent and human psychological bias is more clearly evident.
In accounting, A› eck-Graves et al. (1990), Maines and Hand (1996), Calegari and
Fargher (1997) and Gillette et al. (1999) designed experimental studies in order to
identify possible sources of forecasts bias. Subjects are given, in varying contexts, a
certain number of data on the EPS or dividends of a given asset and are asked to
forecast the next EPS or the next dividends. The framework is compatible with our
notion of pessimism as a transformation of a given distribution. However, the approach
5For example, it has been advocated that many analysts are employed by brokerage ￿rms, so forecast
optimism is consistent with their incentives to promote the purchase of stock or maintain access to top
executives at the ￿rms they follow. More recently, the positive bias in analysts￿forecasts have been
associated with Kahneman and Lovallo￿ s (1993) insider bias (e.g., Darrough and Russell, 2000).
9and the aims of these di⁄erent papers are quite di⁄erent from ours. Indeed, these papers
aim at measuring individuals￿ability to forecast or at analyzing how individuals react
to the release of information. Hence the adopted approach is not suitable in order to
measure what we refer to as pessimism. These authors ￿nd that the forecasts exhibit
signi￿cant positive bias and conclude that there is an optimism bias. But from our
point of view and let aside the problem that the random variable to be forecasted is
too complex, these data do not correspond to something owned by the participants,
high values for the next EPS are neither ￿good￿ nor ￿bad￿ for the respondent, and
henceforth the prediction errors can not be considered as a measure of the degree of
optimism or pessimism. They only re￿ ect the way individuals extrapolate future terms
of a partially observed series of numbers.
For our purpose, the pessimism measure should lead to consider as optimistic indi-
viduals that overweight ￿good￿states of the world and underweight ￿bad￿states of the
world. This means that one has to set up lotteries in which some states are identi￿ed as
unambiguously good (resp. some others as unambiguously bad) and clearly correspond
to good (resp. bad) outcomes for the individual.
In psychology, the notion of pessimism is much more general than in the previously
mentioned ￿nancial economics and accounting papers. A ￿rst set of measures, initiated
by Youmans (1961), is based on the de￿nition of optimism and pessimism as re￿ ecting
positive and negative outcome expectancies. In this spirit, one of the most popular
measures is Scheier and Carver￿ s (1985) Life Orientation Test (LOT)6. Typical questions
include ￿In uncertain times, I usually expect the best￿or ￿If something can go wrong
for me, it will￿ . Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement with these
items. In contrast to expectancy-based measures, attributional measures, like Peterson
6as well as its derived versions (ELOT, Chang et al.,1997, LOT-R, Scheier et al., 1994)
10et al.￿ s (1982) Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) (see also Peterson and Villanova,
1988) provide a more indirect assessment of optimism and pessimism; for each event
(e.g., ￿you have been looking for a job unsuccessfully for some time￿ ), respondents are
asked to write down one major cause for why that event occurred. Individuals who
perceive that good things happen to them because of internal, stable and global factors
are considered to have an optimistic explanatory style.
Wenglert and Rosen (2000) measured optimism through answers to questions about
personal life (20 questions) as well as the world in general (20 questions). In each group
of questions, half of the questions were associated to ￿good￿(resp. "bad") events that
might occur in the future. Participants are asked about the "judged" probability of
occurrence and about a measure of the importance granted to the considered event.
Typical questions are ￿do you think that you will have a happy life ?￿or ￿do you think
there will be a third world war in the next thirty years ?￿ . The correlation between
"judged" probability of occurrence and importance measures the level of optimism.
Focusing on each group of questions, one obtains a measure of personal optimism as
well as a measure of general optimism. The authors obtain an average level of personal
optimism of 0.596 and an average level of general optimism of 0.336. They also obtain
that women are more pessimistic than men.
This approach has the following advantages. It considers pessimism as an individ-
ual characteristics and the introduction of the questions on the importance granted to
the event permits to measure it in a context that is directly related to the individual.
Besides, it is interesting to be able to distinguish between personal and general pes-
simism. However, from our point of view, an important drawback of these psychological
approaches is that they are not rigorously linked to the concept of pessimism in ￿nan-
cial or economic theory, which, as seen above, is related to the transformation of an
11objective distribution. Moreover, it seems that other feelings than optimism/pessimism
interfere when one is to answer a question like ￿do you think you will have a happy life
?￿ . Indeed, among others, self esteem, pride, etc. might bias the answer.
This is why we need an approach that leads to a direct measure of the level of op-
timism/pessimism and that does not involve other individual characteristics or feelings
like overcon￿dence, self-esteem, loss aversion, risk aversion, regret, doubt, etc. Further-
more questions on lotteries, instead of life in general, seem to be more adapted to our
purpose since our aim is to determine if pessimism a⁄ects investors beliefs and how in
a ￿nancial or economic framework and lotteries are usually considered as a simple way
to model ￿nancial investment opportunities.
Finally, even if we are not in the same theoretical framework, we have to mention ex-
perimental studies initiated by Tversky-Kahneman (1992)7 in order to calibrate models
of Prospect Theory and to determine the shape of the probability weighting function.
They all agree on an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function, which means that
it overweights unlikely (extreme) outcomes and underweights outcomes with a medium
or large probability relative to the objective probability. To our knowledge, no clear-cut
conclusion has been drawn regarding pessimism.
In order to get rid of these overweighting and underweighting e⁄ects and to focus
on the concept of pessimism itself, we need a lottery with equiprobable outcomes.
To summarize, one would need a questionnaire based on a hypothetical lottery with
equiprobable outcomes and for which some outcomes are identi￿ed as unambiguously
good for the individual (resp. some others as unambiguously bad).
According to these constraints, we chose the following simple question "what is your
7See also Camerer-Ho (1994), Wu-Gonzalez (1996) and Gonzalez-Wu (1999) in a parametric setting
and Prelec (1998), Bleichrodt-Pinto (2000) and Abdellaoui (2000) in a nonparametric setting.
12own estimation, according to your experience and your luck, of the number of times
heads will occur, i.e. how many times (out of ten) do you think you are going to win
(and get the ten Euros)?".
This question will permit to have a direct measure of the degree of pessimism/optimism
of the individual in a ￿nancial gains context. The event ￿heads occurs￿corresponds to
a gain for the individual, it is therefore legitimate to consider it as a good event for the
individual and the subjective probability associated to this event as a measure of the
individual optimism. Such a measure of Pure-Hazard Introspective Pessimism can be
directly estimated by the number of times xi 2 f0;:::;10g that the individual i thinks
he is going to win (the subjective probability that the individual associates to the event
￿heads occurs￿is then given by ￿i = xi
10). Indeed, a pessimistic individual shall be char-
acterized by a value of xi below the objective value of 5 and the distance to 5 measures
the intensity of his PHIP (oi = xi￿5
5 ):
This simple lottery has also other advantages. First, in the simple context of a
unique binary lottery, all decision theory models can be reduced to the choice of a
given subjective probability and all concepts of pessimism (as well as all concepts of
dominance) are equivalent. This means that we need not adopt a speci￿c model nor a
speci￿c concept of pessimism in order to elicit the presence of pessimism in individual
beliefs. Second, the introduction of the ten times procedure is intended to provide the
individuals with a simple framework, helping them to reveal their subjective probability
associated to the event ￿heads occurs￿ . However, the framework is simple enough in
order to maximize transparency and cognitive ease for the subjects. Therefore, diver-
gence among agents cannot result from a divergent understanding of the framework. All
agents should have the same understanding of the situation and their answers ought to
di⁄er only through di⁄erent psychological evaluations of the probabilities. Besides, we
13refer to real life experiences (heads or tails) and we do not de￿ne the lotteries by the
explicit distribution of the payo⁄s, in order to let room for free interpretation.
Note that the respondents do not have monetary incentives when answering the
questions, as is often the case in experiments. This can be seen as a drawback of our
method of data collection; because respondents are not staking actual funds on the
investment, there is no way to reliably assess whether their actual behaviour would
mimic their answers. This applies equally well of course to all previous studies using
survey questions involving thought experiments. Fortunately, however, there is evidence
(see for instance Beattie and Loomes (1997) and Camerer and Hogarth (1999)) that
for simple (choice) problems respondents do not need real incentives to reveal their
preferences. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) present a theory describing when payments
can be expected to make a large di⁄erence and when not. The main conclusion is that
payments increase the e⁄ort that is made by the respondent. This can be highly relevant
for complex or tedious tasks, but our respondents are only presented with a short and
very simple questionnaire on lotteries. It does not seem that our respondents are bored
or disinterested, so the need for increasing their e⁄ort by monetary incentives is only
small. Finally, there is in our framework a speci￿c problem linked to ￿nancial incentives.
Indeed, since the focus of our study is the elicitation of individual beliefs, the reward
should be related to the accuracy of the predictions. Now, either the participants are
confronted with ￿real lotteries￿ , which means that they truly receive the outcomes, but
in this case, payments for correct forecasts could generate diversi￿cation behaviour: for
instance, in our heads or tails setting, people expecting the best (heads will occur) will
forecast the worst (tails) in order to win money in both cases (the good outcome if heads
occurs and the reward for the correct forecast if tails occurs) even if they believe that
heads will occur. The answers would then involve pessimism as well as risk aversion (or
14utility curvature), and, as we have already underlined it, this is what we want to avoid.
Another possibility would be to confront the participants with hypothetical scenarios
and to only reward the question on their beliefs, but in such a situation, it is likely
that participants would tend to focus on the rewarded task, which is the accuracy of
the prediction and would tend to neglect the lottery itself so that the ￿good￿outcome
would not be felt as good anymore by the participants and, like in the experimental
studies (A› eck-Graves et al. (1990) and others), the approach would not be suitable
to elicit pessimism.
As mentioned in e.g. Hartog et al. (2002), there is a special problem linked to non-
response and response with zero "judged" probability of winning. Indeed, zero "judged"
probability of winning can truly re￿ ect strong pessimism but it can also signal that the
individual refuses, on ideological or religious grounds, to participate in the imaginary
lottery. To avoid this problem, we have started our survey by asking the individuals
whether they are willing to participate in a game of chance.
We also adopted in the survey an approach similar to Wenglert and Rosen (2000) in
order to compare our results with previous ones obtained in the psychological literature.
4. The results, possible interpretations and applications
We are interested in the notion of PHIP itself (the distribution among individuals, the
mean, standard deviation,...), in its links with other demographic variables, such as
gender, income, age, etc. as well as in its links with other notions of pessimism already
introduced in the psychological literature (personal, general).
154.1. Pure-Hazard Introspective Pessimism (PHIP)
































Figure 1: Distribution of PHIP
We can ￿rst observe that there is a great heterogeneity in the level of pessimism
among agents.
This result is consistent with Gillette et al. (1999) and other previous experimental
studies, according to which there is some heterogeneity in subjective expectations, even
though the individuals have access to the same public information (in our setting, the
distribution of the random payments); this heterogeneity comes from a di⁄erent sub-
16jective processing of information. In Gillette et al. (1999), this di⁄erent processing of
information in a dynamic setting is linked to heuristics like the anchoring e⁄ect or the
gambler￿ s fallacy. In empirical studies on professional forecasts, it is linked, as we have
underlined it, to the insider bias. In our context, the questionnaire has been designed
in order to avoid all these e⁄ects and the pessimism seems then to be a primitive indi-
vidual characteristics. It would be interesting to analyze the origin of such a behavioral
pessimism through psychological studies.
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. Std Dev.
-1,000 -0,400 -0,200 -0,215 0,000 1,000 0,352
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of PHIP
For the considered sample of 1,540 individuals, the mean value for the measure of
optimism is equal to -0.215 (Table 1). Equivalently, the mean value for the number of
times the individual thinks he is going to win is equal to 3.925 or the mean subjective
probability is equal to 0.3925. It is signi￿cant and quite striking to observe that when
asked about how many times he/she is going to win at a heads or tails game in ten
draws, an average individual does not answer 5 times as he/she should if thinking under
the objective probability, but answers slightly less than 4 times. This means that, with
our notion of pure-hazard introspective pessimism, the individuals in our sample are
on average pessimistic. This result is in favour of the existence of a behavioral bias
towards pessimism in individual beliefs. The same results have been obtained on a
sample of undergraduate and graduate students in management and mathematics (236
individuals). Notice that when individuals are asked8 about the number of times (out
of ten) they think "heads" will occur without associated gains, the average answer is 5
8The sample for this observation is di⁄erent from the initial one and much smaller.
17as expected and 90% of the answers are exactly 5. This would mean that our results
are not related to numerical skills or to knowledge of elementary probability.
The result on the average level of pessimism is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from empirical
studies on analysts￿earnings forecasts. However, as we have seen above, there are many
convincing possible explanations to account for an optimism bias in earnings forecasts,
speci￿c to analysts (Schipper, 1991, Mc Nichols and O￿ Brien, 1997, Abarbanell and
Lehavy, 2001, Darrough and Russell, 2002). Our result is nevertheless consistent with
Giordani and S￿derlind (2005), who do not deal with earnings but with variables for
which the previous bias does not hold.
There is no evidence of pessimism in A› eck-Graves et al. (1990), Maines and
Hand (1996), Calegari and Fargher (1997) and Gillette et al. (1999) but, as we have
underlined it, this is not surprising since the experiments are not designed to measure
optimism/pessimism in our sense. However, it is interesting to notice that in these
experiments, the forecasts are more pessimistic in the market sessions where the agents
hold the asset and receive the corresponding dividends than in the non-market sessions,
which can be interpreted as re￿ ecting some form of pessimism in our sense. Moreover,
in Stevens and Williams (2003), it is shown that individuals systematically underreact
to positive and negative information and that the underreaction is greater for positive
information than negative information, which can also be interpreted as some form of
pessimism. This is also con￿rmed by Taylor (1991), who ￿nds that ￿negative information
is weighted more heavily than positive information￿ . Notice that such a behaviour
could possibly account for the presence of some pure-hazard introspective pessimism in
individual beliefs. In other words, pessimistic individuals in our survey would be those
who put more weight on all the times they have lost at heads or tails than on the times
they have won.









































Figure 2: Distribution of PHIP by gender
Pessimism and gender. The average level of pessimism is equal to -0.237 (3.815)
for women and -0.192 (4.04) for men, hence women in our sample and for our notion
of pessimism, are more pessimistic than men. This is con￿rmed by a Wilcoxon test
(W = 2:8 ￿ 105; p-value = 1% < 5%).
Pessimism and age. By sorting the individuals into age classes, and by computing
the average value for our measure of pessimism for each class, we obtain the following
19results, which show a decreasing relationship between optimism and age (Table 2).
Spearman￿ s and Kendall￿ s tests con￿rm a decreasing relation, even though the Rh￿ and
the Tau are small (S = 6:7￿108; Rh^ o=￿0:08, p￿value = 0:019 and Z = ￿3:6;Tau =
￿0:06; p ￿ value = 10￿4).
Age Band (0;25] (25;30] (30;35] (35;40] (40;45] (45;50]
Mean -0,1497 -0,1919 -0,2280 -0,245 -0,227 -0,248
Median -0,200 -0,200 -0,200 -0,200 -0,200 -0,200
Min. -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000
Max. 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0,800 1,000
Std Dev. 0,395 0,362 0,359 0,328 0,324 0,331
N￿ of Obs. 191 372 292 289 230 166
Table 2: PHIP and age
Pessimism and income. As far as income is concerned, our initial sample is
slightly modi￿ed (from 1,540 to 1,328 individuals) since some individuals refused to
answer (74) and this data is missing for some others (138). We divide our sample of
1,328 individuals into 7 income classes leading to the following results.
9The alternative hypotheses are such that Tau and Rh￿ are negative.
20Income ￿200 (200,400] (400,600] (600,800] (800,1000] (1000,1500] >1500
Mean -0,295 -0,320 -0,233 -0,187 -0,231 -0,200 -0,207
Median -0,200 -0,200 -0,200 -0,200 -0,200 -0,200 -0,200
Min. -0,800 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000
Max. 0,400 0,400 0,800 1,000 0,600 0,800 1,000
Std Dev. 0,315 0,305 0,337 0,363 0,308 0,374 0,401
N￿
of Obs. 19 160 317 402 229 74 53
Table 3: PHIP and income
The Kruskall Wallis test indicates that these variables are linked (KW = 14;df = 6,
p￿value = 3%): It seems on the means by class that there is an increasing relationship
between pessimism and income.
It is interesting to notice that our measure of pessimism has the properties usually
granted to risk aversion, i.e., it is greater for women than for men, it increases with age
and decreases with income.
4.3. PHIP, personal pessimism and general pessimism
For our considered sample of 1,540 individuals, the respondents exhibit personal opti-
mism and are almost neutral with respect to general events (Table 4). Wenglert and
Rosen (2000), that deals with a sample of 183 individuals, also obtain personal opti-
mism, with a level of 0.596, which is almost similar to ours. They also obtain, as we do,
a level of general optimism (0.336) which is lower than the level of personal optimism
(0.596). The di⁄erence with our results is that they obtain general optimism whereas












































































Figure 3 : PHIP, personal pessimism and general pessimism.
Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
IOP -1,000 1,000 -0,215 0,352
Personal Pessimism -0,819 0,988 0,537 0,293
General Pessimism -0,968 0,865 -0,004 0,342
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of PHIP, Personal Pessimism and General Pessimism
22We have analyzed the link between the three di⁄erent notions of pessimism, our
notion of pessimism (PHIP) and the two standard notions of pesssimism in psychology
(personal pessimism and general pessimism). The following Table shows that there is
some increasing relationship between PHIP and personal pessimism as well as between
personal and general pessimism.
Kendall￿ sTau Spearman￿ s Rh￿ Pearson Correlation
PHIP / Pers. Pessimism 0;14￿ 0;19￿ 0;14￿
PHIP / Gen. Pessimism ￿0;03 ￿0;04 0;03
Pers. Pess. / Gen. Pess. 0;11￿ 0;17￿ 0;21￿
Table 5: Results of Kendall￿ s, Spearman￿ s and Pearson￿ s tests. *: signi￿catively di⁄erent from
0.
Moreover, three questions in the questionnaire on personal pessimism have attracted
our attention : ￿you have no chance to win at a lottery game￿ (Q1), ￿you have no
chance to be selected for a television game￿ (Q2) and ￿you will win one day at the
promo sport10￿(Q3), since intuitively, they should have a link with our notion of PHIP.
Kendall Spearman Pearson Correlation
PHIP/Q1 ￿0;23￿ ￿0;30￿ ￿0;30
PHIP/Q2 ￿0;21￿ ￿0;27￿ ￿0;27
PHIP/Q3 0;15￿ 0;19￿ 0;20
Table 6: Link between PHIP, (Q1), (Q2), (Q3).
10The promosport is a game of chance dealing with sport results.
23Table 6 shows that there is a decreasing relationship between (Q1) and PHIP as
well as between (Q2) and PHIP, and an increasing relationship between (Q3) and PHIP,
which seems natural. However these relations are not very strong.
4.4. Impact on the risk premium
In a continuous time CCAPM model with a subjective belief, it is easy to obtain an
adapted CCAPM formula that clearly re￿ ects the impact of the representative agent￿ s
pessimism (see Jouini-Napp, 2004). The di⁄erence between the level of the Market Price
of Risk in the subjective belief setting and in the standard setting is precisely given by
the level of pessimism of the representative agent measured by the deviation in mean,
in units of standard deviation, of the aggregate wealth instantaneous growth rate. The
presence of pessimism increases then the market price of risk and might contribute to
giving explanations to the risk premium puzzle. The interpretation of this result is the
following. The representative agent￿ s pessimism leads him/her to underestimate the
average rate of return of equity leaving unchanged his/her estimation of the risk free
rate. Thus, the objective expectation of the MPR is greater than the representative
agent￿ s subjective expectation hence is greater than the standard MPR.
In our survey, we obtained that the average subjective probability of the ￿good state￿
is ￿ ￿0.3925. It is easy to see that for the considered lottery the deviation in mean,
in units of standard deviation, of the expected gain is equal to -0.215. This implies
that for an asset whose volatility is 15%, the (theoretical) equilibrium risk premium
is increased by approximately 3.2% in the subjective beliefs setting compared to the
standard setting. Implicit in our calibration is the idea that the individual cognitive
bias, when facing a pure hazard situation, is characterized by the deviation in mean, in
units of standard deviation, independently of the speci￿c frameworks.
24For a GDP growth volatility of around 1.5%, our level of pessimism is equivalent
to an underestimation of the GDP growth level of approximately 0.32%. Giodarni and
S￿derlind (2005), for the 1982-2002 sample, obtain that professionals participating in
the Survey of Professional Forecasters underestimate the GDP growth by 0.64% on
average (which is greater than our 0.32%). Nevertheless,when they consider the period
1972-2002, the underestimation of the GDP is of 0.2% on average (which is lower than
our 0.32%). Moreover, this implies that on the period 1972-1982, the forecasters have
overestimated the GDP growth by 0.68% It seems therefore di¢ cult to draw conclusions
on the level of pessimism from such empirical studies, since the results are apparently
highly dependent upon the considered period and the environmental factors.
Our results seem to show that there is a persistent behavioral pessimistic bias, which
should not depend upon the environment and that this bias has a signi￿cant impact on
the equilibrium risk premium.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that there is a pessimistic behavioral bias in individual be-
liefs in a lottery context and we have denoted it by pure-hazard introspective pessimism
(PHIP). The very simple lottery we adopted in the survey has permitted to show the
presence of pessimism without having to refer to a speci￿c decision-theoretical model.
The concept of PHIP is di⁄erent from the concepts of personal and general pessimism
previously introduced in the psychology literature even if there is a signi￿cant link be-
tween all these concepts. We have obtained with our notion of pessimism that men
are less pessimistic than women and that the level of pessimism increases with age and
decreases with income.
25When embedded in a capital markets equilibrium framework, pessimism has a direct
impact on the equilibrium risk premium, as shown by Abel (2002) and Jouini-Napp
(2004, 2005a). The survey we conducted permits to calibrate this impact.
It is a delicate question to identify the origin of the elicited pessimism. The observed
pessimism might result from an individual learning process, where indiduals overesti-
mate bad experiences (see Taylor, 1991). Another possible partial explanation might
come from the fact that people are used, with casinos and national lotteries, to getting
less than the theoretical average gain in pure hazard games, which leads them to sys-
tematically underestimate their probability of success. Finally, people seem to be regret
averse in their choices (Joseph et al., 1996, Ritov, 1996). Regret avoidance may re￿ ect a
self deception mechanism designed to protect self esteem about decision making ability,
i.e. a calculated avoidance of unpleasant future feelings. The elicited pessimism could
be interpreted as defensive pessimism, an anticipatory strategy that involves setting
defensively low expectations prior to entering a situation so as to defend against loss of
self esteem in the event of failure.
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